Sign up to get the latest oral arguments and other media files from the Supreme Court of Texas. http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/sc-podcasts.asp 2009 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss en-us Mon, 27 Feb 2012 15:34:28 -0600 webmaster@courts.state.tx.us Mon, 27 Feb 2012 15:31:40 -0600 FeedForAll v2.0 (2.0.2.9) http://www.feedforall.com Oral argument recordings from the Supreme Court of Texas The Supreme Court of Texas posts audio recordings of oral arguments to allow ready access to the arguments by the public and lawyers across the state. The recordings are usually posted within a few hours of the oral argument. The Supreme Court of Texas State Office of Court Administration webmaster@courts.state.tx.us sc oral argument podcasts, supreme podcasts, texas supreme court no no <b>Case No.10-0997</b> <br /> Paradigm Oil Inc. et al. v. Retamco Operating Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32114" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/09/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp C1775120-8644-40D5-8EDA-D003C66CFA67 Mon, 27 Feb 2012 15:31:40 -0600 10-0997 Paradigm Oil Inc. et al. v. Retamco Operating Inc. Paradigm Oil Inc. et al. v. Retamco Operating Inc. from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Susan S. Vance, Austin For respondent: James L. Drought, San Antonio A principal issue is whether a "death penalty" default-judgment sanction properly excluded the defaulting party from contesting damages. In this case Retamco won a default judgment against Paradigm after Paradigm refused to answer Retamco’s suit for allegedly unpaid royalties and refused to respond to discovery requests or appear at motions hearings. The trial court barred Paradigm’s evidence and arguments on damages. The court of appeals affirmed the discovery sanctions but twice reversed the damages calculations for legally insufficient evidence to support them. After a third damages hearing, the appeals court affirmed Retamco’s award of more than $37 million, including costs, fees, interest and exemplary damages. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:55 The Supreme Court of Texas Paradigm, Oil, Retamco, Operating no no <b>Case No.10-0927</b> <br /> Rio Grande Regional Hospital Inc. and Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare L.P. v. Diana Lopez Villarreal, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32044" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/09/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 0BF285ED-C848-42B8-968F-500BDF284BCA Mon, 27 Feb 2012 15:27:24 -0600 10-0927 Rio Grande Regional Hospital Inc. and Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare L.P. v. Diana Lopez Villarreal, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Mike A. Hatchell, Austin For respondents: Brandy M. Wingate, McAllen, and Curtis L. Cukjati, San Antonio In this case alleging health care-liability claims resulting from a patient’s suicide in a hospital, the principal issues are (1) whether the appeals court applied the wrong standard to review the jury’s finding that the suicide was a foreseeable result of nurses’ actions and omissions; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence established that the patient’s suicide was foreseeable and nurses’ actions and omissions constituted its cause in fact; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred by imposing on nurses a duty to diagnose a patient’s psychiatric illness. Villarreal sued the hospital after her husband, admitted for severe headaches, fatigue and fainting spells, killed himself two days later by slashing his neck with a razor a nurse provided him for shaving. On his admission, he told doctors he was not depressed. Doctors prescribed an anti-anxiety drug and an antidepressant also used to treat anxiety. A jury found the hospital 75 percent negligent for the nurses’ acts and omissions and Mrs. Villarreal 25 percent at fault for failing to disclose to disclose a suicide note her husband wrote and his complaints about his "deteriorating" mental state. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment based on the jury verdict, holding in part that proximate cause could be based on "general danger" or "some type of injury" reasonably foreseen by providing Mr. Villarreal the razor. The hospital argues that the standard should have been that the suicide was injury of a "general character" that the nurses should have reasonably anticipated. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 26:22 The Supreme Court of Texas Rio Grande, Regional, Hospital, Columbia, Healthcare, Villarreal no no <b>Case No.11-0255</b> <br /> In re the Office of the Attorney General <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32415" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/27/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 2FC9BD3E-217A-424E-B2AA-BE552E418CB2 Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:40:24 -0600 11-0255 In re the Office of the Attorney General from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relators: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin, and Jessica Hall Janicek, Dallas For real party in interest: Thomas M. Michel, Fort Worth The issue is whether a parent in arrears on child support subject to an enforcement motion may be found in contempt if he paid the due child support covered by the motion but not support he owed in the interim before the motion hearing. In this case the Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office sought as much as $23,000 an ex-husband owed in support for his six children, including payments the office believed he would likely fail to pay. After he was served with the enforcement motion, he paid what he owned in full as of September 2008 and moved for reduction in the $5,400-a-month child-support order. By the hearing in February 2009 he was several months behind on his payments. The trial court denied his motion to modify the child-support order and found him in contempt for payments he made in September 2008 that he failed to make before the enforcement motion was filed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:20 The Supreme Court of Texas Office, Attorney, General, OAG no no <b>Case No.10-0950</b> <br /> Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32067" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/27/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp C9E56EE8-6F1E-48DB-AE89-9022ED3806D9 Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:37:39 -0600 10-0950 Enbridge Pipelines (East Texas) L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC from Marion County and the Sixth District Court of Appeals, Texarkana For petitioner: Stephen G. Tipps, Houston For respondent: Glenn Sodd, Corsicana The principal issues in this condemnation-valuation dispute involving land on which a gas-processing plant exists are (1) whether testimony by the landowner’s valuation expert violates the value-to-the-taker rule, that is, assessing the land value with the existing plant and easements instead of its value as rural residential property without those improvements and (2) whether the expert testimony violated the project-enhancement rule that precludes valuing for condemnation purposes the property as it has been enhanced. In this case Enbridge Pipelines took over an affiliate’s lease of Avinger Timber’s land used for the processing plant. When Avinger and Enbridge failed to agree on renewal terms, Enbridge, as a pipeline company with condemnation power, petitioned to take the land. In the valuation trial, the court denied the pipeline’s challenge to Avinger’s expert, who assessed value based on factors including the existing plant, the pipelines that connected to it and how much Enbridge would pay if the lease terminated and it had to remove the plant and other improvements. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to accept the Avinger expert’s testimony and reject Enbridge’s. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 45:39 The Supreme Court of Texas Enbridge, Pipelines, East, Texas, Avinger, Timber no no <b>Case No.10-0887</b> <br /> Wendell Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32007" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/27/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp A41F6254-4C50-4C91-B418-2F94A9EEC8DA Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:34:40 -0600 10-0887 Wendell Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC, et al. from Wood County and the 12th District Court of Appeals, Tyler For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondents: Greg Smith, Tyler The principal issues are (1) whether the exculpatory clause in a model joint-operating agreement, allowing liability only for gross negligence or willful misconduct, extends to a working-interest operator’s alleged breach of the operating agreement by neglect and (2) whether the appeals court erred by assessing the legal and factual evidence against a contract-breach standard instead of gross negligence or willful conduct. In this case Reeder sued to claim exclusive right, as operator, to use oil wellbores in a designated production unit. The working-interest holders countersued Reeder, claiming he breached the joint-operating agreement and allowed by his inaction the production unit to expire. On appeal, Reeder argued that the jury’s award for the working-interest holders was based on insufficient evidence that he acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct even if the joint-operating agreement applied to him. Wood County and the other working-interest holders contended the gross-negligence and willful-conduct standard did not apply to the breach question and should not have been included in the jury instructions. The court of appeals determined that the gross-negligence and willful-misconduct standards from the exculpatory clause should not have been included in the jury questions, but held that Reeder breached his duties under the joint-operating agreement. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:44 The Supreme Court of Texas Wendell, Reeder, Wood, County, Energy no no <b>Case No.11-0059</b> <br /> El Paso Marketing L.P. v. Wolf Hollow I L.P <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32224" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/08/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 06C8BE0B-4012-4EC0-B200-F2F1CC9D9CBC Mon, 27 Feb 2012 11:37:35 -0600 11-0059 El Paso Marketing L.P. v. Wolf Hollow I L.P from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: D. Mitchell McFarland and S. Shawn Stephens, Houston For respondent: Solace Kirkland, Houston A principal issue is whether contract remedies preclude a power-plant owner’s negligence claim for damage from gas-delivery interruptions and contaminated gas. The plant owner, Wolf Hollow, contends it had no contract obligations because it assigned its gas-delivery contract to its agent, El Paso Marketing, its gas supplier. El Paso assumed the gas-delivery contract Wolf Hollow had with Enterprise, a pipeline company. Both the assigned contract and Wolf Hollow’s supply contract with El Paso had clauses waiving consequential damages resulting from interruptions and problems with gas quality. El Paso sued Wolf Hollow to declare it had no liability and brought Enterprise into the suit as a third-party defendant. Wolf Hollow then sued Enterprise for negligently causing the gas-supply interruptions that forced Wolf Hollow to buy replacement power and for negligently delivering contaminated gas that damaged its plant. The trial court granted El Paso and Enterprise summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed in part, but remanded Wolf Hollow’s negligence claim against Enterprise. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:07 The Supreme Court of Texas El Paso, Marketing, Wolf, Hollow no no <b>Case No.10-0781</b> <br /> U-Haul International Inc., et al. v. Talmadge Waldrip, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31904" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/08/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 0E95E8DC-13C4-44D9-9056-7E2EA15EABDB Mon, 27 Feb 2012 11:33:13 -0600 10-0781 U-Haul International Inc., et al. v. Talmadge Waldrip, et al. from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioners: David E. Keltner, Fort Worth, and Thomas S. Leatherbury, Dallas For respondents/cross-petitioners: Ted B. Lyon Jr., Mesquite The issues in this personal-injury case involving a rental truck’s parking-brake failure are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence showed gross negligence; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s negligence findings; and (3) whether a Canadian consumer-safety group’s report was relevant evidence or hearsay. Waldrip and his family sued U-Haul International, the company’s Texas franchise and its contract dealer from which he rented a truck that crushed him as he tried to stop it from rolling away. A jury found all three companies negligent by variously failing to inspect and maintain the truck’s brake system and transmission properly. Jurors also found U-Haul International and the Texas franchise grossly negligent. In its judgment the trial court awarded almost $45.7 million in actual and exemplary damages. The court of appeals reversed the gross-negligence finding against U-Haul International and the $11.7 million exemplary damages award against it and affirmed the remainder. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:50 The Supreme Court of Texas U-Haul, International, Talmadge, Waldrip no no <b>Case No.10-0615</b> <br /> Ashford Partners Ltd. v. ECO Resources Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31739" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/08/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 9AAAAC16-FDEA-4A56-8B6A-065E5BADF4F3 Mon, 27 Feb 2012 11:26:56 -0600 10-0615 Ashford Partners Ltd. v. ECO Resources Inc. from Fort Bend County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondent: Michael P. Cash, Houston Principal issues in this lease dispute over a construction defect are (1) whether Ashford, which took over ECO’s building lease when it bought the building, had a duty to complete the construction "punch list" according to ECO’s plans even though ECO had signed an estoppel agreement with the previous owner "accepting the premises without exception" and (2) whether the damages measure for the construction defect should be diminished lease value instead of repair costs. After the building’s foundation cracked and tilted, Ashford sued the contractor and sued to declare it had not breached the lease with ECO. ECO countersued for breach, arguing that Ashford, as the landlord by assignment, assumed the original landlord’s obligation to complete the building according to plans. The trial court awarded ECO damages for diminished lease value and attorneys fees. On review, the appeals court affirmed, holding in part that Ashford exclusively failed to complete a necessary punch-list item linked to the foundation problem after it assumed the lease but before the deadline for completing the punch list. The court of appeals also held diminution of the lease value was the proper damages measure because ECO leased the building and did not own it. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:41 The Supreme Court of Texas Ashford, Partners, ECO, Resources no no <b>Case No.11-0855</b> <br /> Nestlé USA Inc. v. Susan Combs, Comptroller, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32995" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/12/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 02688094-4BDB-4DDA-97CB-6FA5DCB75A2A Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:31:45 -0600 11-0855 Nestlé USA Inc. v. Susan Combs, Comptroller, and Greg Abbott, Attorney General Direct appeal For plaintiff: Peter A. Nolan, Austin For respondent/real party interest: Rance L. Craft, Austin In this constitutional challenge against the state franchise tax, the principal issues are (1) whether the 2006 statutory procedure permitting a direct challenge in this Court to the franchise tax’s constitutionality allows such a suit by a taxpayer that has not first paid its tax bill under protest; if so, (2) whether the tax violates the state constitutional prohibition against taxes that are not equal and uniform; (3) whether the tax violates the federal constitution’s equal-protection clause; (4) whether it violates Nestlé’s 14th amendment’s federal due-process protection; and (5) whether the tax violates Nestlé’s protection under the federal constitution’s commerce clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 1:08:48 The Supreme Court of Texas Nestlé, Susan, Combs, Comptroller, Greg, Abbott, Attorney General no no <b>Case No.11-0519</b> <br /> Evanston Insurance Co. v. Legacy of Life Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32663" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/12/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 86E1FB5E-27E5-4D0C-A502-CA3D62BE4075 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:28:35 -0600 11-0519 Evanston Insurance Co. v. Legacy of Life Inc. certified questions from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals For appellant: Marc J. Wojciechowski, Spring For appellee: John C. Cave and Miguel Villarreal Jr., San Antonio In this insurance-coverage dispute involving a non-profit organ-collection company that allegedly sold human organs through a for-profit affiliate, the Fifth Circuit asks: (1) whether personal injury under the policy - defined as bodily injury, sickness or disease including death to any person resulting from that injury, sickness or disease - covers mental anguish for someone who did not suffer physical injury or disease and (2) whether property damage under the policy, defined as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including consequential loss of use, or loss of use of tangible property that has not been physically injured or destroyed," includes coverage for the underlying plaintiff’s loss of her dead mother’s tissues, organs, bones and body parts. In this case Evanston refused to defend its insured, Legacy of Life, when it was sued by the daughter who donated her mother’s organs and who contends the donation was contingent on the their distribution without profit. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for the insured, Legacy of Life, on the duty-to-defend question. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:16 The Supreme Court of Texas Evanston, Insurance, Legacy of Life no no <b>Case No.10-0886</b> <br /> In re Billy Frederick Allen <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32006" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/12/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp C04F9C12-EC8C-400C-BF93-3CC3241AEF34 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:25:53 -0600 10-0886 In re Billy Frederick Allen Original proceeding under the Tim Cole Act For relator: Kristopher E. Moore, McKinney For respondent/real party in interest: Philip A. Lionberger, Austin The issue in Allen’s effort to recover compensation for wrongful imprisonment is whether his habeas corpus relief was for actual innocence or whether compensation under the Tim Cole Act can be had for habeas relief by way of a so-called Schlup claim. The state comptroller denied Allen’s money claim for the almost 29 years he spent in prison before the Court of Criminal Appeals granted his habeas petition. The court based its decision on ineffective assistance of counsel, but Allen’s writ application - the fourth he filed - was brought on the Schlup procedure allowing a prisoner to filed such a subsequent writ petition if actual innocence were an issue despite the procedural bar against multiple habeas writ petitions. The Court of Criminal Appeals split 5-3, supporting habeas relief with a plurality opinion that addressed his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim but not his actual-innocence argument. After the decision, and Allen’s release on bond, the Dallas County district attorney dismissed his case but left open the possibility it could be filed again. When the controller denied his Tim Cole Act application, Allen brought this mandamus petition to order the comptroller to make payment. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:01 The Supreme Court of Texas Billy, Frederick, Allen no no <b>Case No.11-0079</b> <br /> Oncor Electric Delivery Co. LLC v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit and Fort Worth Transportation Authority <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32243" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/11/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 43FF748D-D1E0-4C9D-8449-B66E0B519827 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 11:06:39 -0600 11-0079 Oncor Electric Delivery Co. LLC v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit and Fort Worth Transportation Authority from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: James C. Ho, Houston For respondents: Joycell Hollins, Dallas For amicus curiae Liberty Institute: Kelly J. Shackelford, Plano Three principal issues in this condemnation case involving the Trinity Railway Express commuter-rail line are (1) whether Oncor has authority to condemn an easement for a transmission line above the railway authority’s tracks and, if so, (2) whether Trinity Railway Express has immunity from suit in such a condemnation proceeding; and (3) whether House Bill 971 (Texas Utility Code section 37.053, allowing all approved transmission lines across all public land except that owned by the state) applies. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 33:59 The Supreme Court of Texas Oncor, Electric, Delivery, Dallas, Area, Rapid, Transit, Fort Worth, Transportation, Authority no no <b>Case No.10-1028</b> <br /> PNS Stores Inc. v. Anna E. Rivera <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32146" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/11/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 96AF71BA-7AA7-4BE4-858F-4CDEE662CFDF Thu, 12 Jan 2012 11:03:07 -0600 10-1028 PNS Stores Inc. v. Anna E. Rivera from Bexar County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: David A. Oliver Jr., Houston For respondent: Daniel J. T. Sciano, San Antonio, and Kimberly S. Keller, Boerne Three principal issues arise from this petition from a denied bill of review: (1) whether a default tort judgment in 2000 is void or voidable for defects in service of process; (2) whether the four-year bill-of-review limitations applies to an attack on a void default judgment (or whether alleged extrinsic fraud can toll the limitations); and (3) whether an amended summary judgment in a federal suit on the same facts - the amended judgment, with prejudice, barred the case from being refiled - renders the state default judgment void. In seeking to overturn the default judgment, PNS Stores claimed it did not have knowledge of the suit, which was served on the company’s registered agent, and alleged defects in the method of service. PNS argues in part that the service-of-process defects render the default judgment void and subject to direct attack or voidable and subject to indirect or collateral attack. The company also contends that limitations should be delayed because of extrinsic fraud. It argues that notice of the $1.2-million default judgment in the underlying negligence case was served on the registered agent, not the company as party, and execution to collect the judgment - when the company claims it had first notice of the judgment - was delayed by design for almost 10 years. The trial court denied PNS Stores’ effort to overturn the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 41:02 The Supreme Court of Texas PNS Stores, Anna, Rivera no no <b>Case No.10-0648</b> <br /> El Paso Field Services L.P. and Gulfterra South Texas L.P. v. MasTec North America Inc., et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31772" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/11/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 67E60C55-30A1-43CD-B8DB-46BCC30EA764 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:59:23 -0600 10-0648 El Paso Field Services L.P. and Gulfterra South Texas L.P. v. MasTec North America Inc., et al. from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Murray Fogler and David M. Gunn, Houston For respondents: Kevin Dubose, Houston The issues in this dispute over alleged unforeseen costs in a pipeline-replacement project are (1) whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that El Paso’s contract with MasTec allocated risk of "foreign crossings" to El Paso and (2) whether the appeals court correctly applied federal common law instead of Texas common law. In this case MasTec sued for additional costs it encountered to work around and through other pipelines and obstructions for the new pipeline it contracted with El Paso to build. In the contract El Paso stated it would use due diligence to disclose such foreign crossings to MasTec, but its alignment sheets identified 250 and MasTec claimed it encountered perhaps 750. The contract specified that MasTec would assume all risks "notwithstanding" El Paso’s representations. A jury awarded additional costs to MasTec, but the trial court rendered judgment for El Paso notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals reversed, holding that under a U.S. Supreme Court decision risks were the owner’s responsibility from defective specifications that the owner was better able to determine. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:27 The Supreme Court of Texas El Paso, Field, Services, Gulfterra, South, Texas, Mas,Tec, North, America no no <b>Case No.10-0859</b> <br /> In the Matter of M.P.A. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31980" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/10/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 27FD6624-DB51-4850-8EA5-70DD5A515315 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:56:32 -0600 10-0859 In the Matter of M.P.A. from Bell County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Dustin Howell, Austin, and Clint Broden, Dallas For respondent: James (Jim) V. Murphy and John Gauntt Jr., Belton In this juvenile-delinquency habeas-corpus review two principal issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by denying habeas relief on post-conviction evidence that a psychologist falsely testified about testing reliability by which he concluded the juvenile sex offender had pedophile propensities (and would likely offend again) and (2) whether habeas relief should have been granted on actual-innocence grounds because the complainant later recanted. Central to both issues are the differing appellate-review standards in each. In this case M.P.A. sought habeas relief because a cousin recanted her testimony that he sexually abused her when she was 7 and he was 15. He also claimed the psychologist called during his sentencing falsely testified that a test by which he concluded M.P.A. had pedophile tendencies was more reliable that it was. On review, the appeals court rejected both claims, noting for the recanted-evidence claim that conflicting evidence about reasons the cousin recanted her testimony failed the required clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for habeas relief. But on the testing-reliability claim, the court of appeals determined that M.P.A. had to show by a preponderance of evidence that the psychologist’s testimony influenced the jury’s decision on a 20-year sentence and that the expert testimony would have been excluded without the psychologist’s false statements. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 47:18 The Supreme Court of Texas M.P.A. no no <b>Case No.10-0802</b> <br /> Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Gloria Garcia <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31924" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/10/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp A1A10851-EC38-4E95-9E25-92AF71BAE1E3 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:53:48 -0600 10-0802 Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Gloria Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: David P. Hansen, Austin For respondent: Savannah Robinson, Danbury Two principal issues in this age-discrimination claim are (1) whether a prima-facie case can be established when the replacement worker is older than the discharged employee bringing the claim and (2) whether the 60-day filing deadline in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act includes within it service of process and, if so, whether compliance is jurisdictional. Garcia, who was 48 when she was fired, sued the district for discrimination after filing her administrative complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission. Mission school district moved to dismiss the lawsuit, based on a jurisdictional plea because Garcia failed to state jurisdictional facts to support her age-discrimination claim by showing her work replacement was older than she was. The trial court denied the district’s plea. The appeals court affirmed on the age claim, reasoning that the district’s contention that Garcia’s replacement was three years older did not conclusively negate the required element that she might "otherwise show that she was discharged because of age" apart from showing her replacement was younger. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 40:47 The Supreme Court of Texas Mission, Consolidated, Independent, School, District, Gloria, Garcia no no <b>Case No.10-0554</b> <br /> American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Daniel Samudio <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31678" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 01/10/2012 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2012oa.asp 4F39228A-EEDF-4DA9-B829-DD9FFA9FE854 Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:48:49 -0600 10-0554 American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Daniel Samudio from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Robert D. Stokes, Austin For respondent: Byron C. Keeling, Houston The principal issues in this workers-compensation impairment-rating dispute are (1) whether a trial court has jurisdiction over an impairment-rating dispute when only one rating was before the workers-comp division and (2) whether the trial court or appeals court has jurisdiction to assign a new impairment rating if the one presented to the workers-comp division was invalid. In this case Zurich contested Samudio’s 20-percent impairment rating a doctor calculated for his spinal injury that resulted from a fall at work, arguing that the impairment rating was not properly calculated according to mandated American Medical Association guidelines. The court of appeals determined that the rating methodology the doctor used to establish Samudio’s impairment rating might not have been proper, but the rating was valid in the absence of any other presented in the administrative hearing. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:12 The Supreme Court of Texas American, Zurich, Insurance, Daniel, Samudio no no <b>Case No.10-0953</b> <br /> Ford Motor Co. v. Richard H. Garcia <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32070" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/08/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 701777A3-FA58-4C85-AD3C-8A1FCFFB1B5B Thu, 8 Dec 2011 12:07:43 -0600 10-0953 Ford Motor Co. v. Richard H. Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Michael Eady, Austin For respondent: Isaac Tawil, McAllen The principal issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees to a guardian ad litem for work allegedly outside the scope of his appointment or relied on insufficient evidence in its award. Ford appealed Garcia’s $28,200 award for his appointment as a guardian ad litem. The trial court appointed him to protect the interests of a man in a settlement by Ford with the man, who suffered traumatic brain injury, and his wife. Ford argues the guardian ad litem billed for review of litigation documents and other work that exceeded his need to assure the injured man’s interests in a proposed settlement. Ford also argued the guardian’s invoice did not specify how much time was spent on his review or how much was spent by his staff. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s award of Garcia’s fee. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:58 The Supreme Court of Texas Ford, Motor, Richard, Garcia no no <b>Case No.10-0666</b> <br /> City of Round Rock, et al. v. Jaime Rodriguez, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31790" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/08/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp AAFE0CE3-2E55-43C5-B8C2-0DA004DF6EA5 Thu, 8 Dec 2011 12:04:56 -0600 10-0666 City of Round Rock, et al. v. Jaime Rodriguez, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Douglas W. Alexander, Austin For respondents: Craig Deats, Austin The issue is whether the Texas Labor Code provides public employees a right to have a union representative present at an investigative interview, that is, whether the Weingarten right applies to Texas labor law. Rodriguez sued to declare his right to have a union representative present when his supervisors interviewed him on a complaint that he misused sick leave. The city’s fire chief denied his request for a union representative. Rodriguez argues that the Weingarten right, established for investigations under the National Labor Relations Act, should apply to similar proceedings under the Texas Labor Code because Weingarten established the right to have union representation on the rationale that the federal law protected employment, as does Texas labor law. The city contends Weingarten was decided more than 75 years after the applicable state labor law provision and the provision does not apply to public employees. The trial court decided in Rodriguez’s favor and the court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:05 The Supreme Court of Texas City, Round, Rock, Jaime, Rodriguez no no <b>Case No.10-0223</b> <br /> Centocor Inc. v. Patricia Hamilton and Thomas Hamilton, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31352" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/08/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 4075B5A5-054C-4ACD-AA7E-D6376CEC880F Thu, 8 Dec 2011 12:01:09 -0600 10-0223 Centocor Inc. v. Patricia Hamilton and Thomas Hamilton, et al. from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston For respondents/cross-petitioners: Craig T. Enoch, Austin For cross-respondent Michael G. Bullen, M.D.: Thomas F. Nye, Corpus Christi For amici curiae Texas Medical Association, et al.: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas Principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by discounting the learned-intermediary doctrine when fraud allegations were based on a drug-marketing video shown to patients; (2) whether expert testimony should have been required to assist in establishing that the existing warning was unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the product’s side-effects warning can prove causation of one of those effects. In his case the Hamiltons sued after Patricia Hamilton developed lupus-like symptoms from a drug she used to treat her Crohn’s disease. They alleged Centocor, the drug manufacturer, used direct-to-patient advertising that did not include side-effects warnings about symptoms she developed. A jury found Centocor committed fraud and awarded damages, including punitive damages. On review, the appeals court rejected Centocor’s argument that the learned-intermediary doctrine shielded it from liability because Mrs. Hamilton’s prescribing doctor was responsible for warning her about adverse effects. It held the doctrine was defeated when the manufacturer was misleading in a promotional video by omitting potential adverse effects. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 59:13 The Supreme Court of Texas Centocor, Patricia, Hamilton,Thomas, Hamilton no no <b>Case No.10-0995</b> <br /> Dr. Erwin Cruz v. Andrews Restoration Inc. and Rudy Martinez <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32112" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/07/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 38FDA91E-85C5-4116-9274-D95464071D58 Wed, 7 Dec 2011 14:17:08 -0600 10-0995 Dr. Erwin Cruz v. Andrews Restoration Inc. and Rudy Martinez from Dallas County and the 5th District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Jennifer G. Martin, Addison For cross-respondent Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas: Russell W. Schell, Addison For respondent/cross-petitioner: Shawn M. McCaskill, Dallas Two principal issues are (1) whether "restore" as used in the deceptive-trade practices statute incorporates equitable rescission (requiring surrendering benefits under a contract) and (2) whether the main-purpose doctrine will allow an oral promise to pay another’s debt to be enforced despite the statute of frauds. In this case Andrews Restoration (doing business as Protech Services) sued Cruz and his insurer, Chubb Lloyds, for more than $700,000 for Protech’s work to control humidity - and mold growth - in Cruz’s house. Cruz initially hired Protech to repair a water leak and, after mold was discovered, worked to reduce the mold growth in a damages-mediation effort Cruz ordered while Chubb Lloyds determined whether to declare the house a loss. Andrews Restoration alleged in part breach of an oral contract by Chubb Lloyds to pay for the mold remediation and also sued Cruz for breach of a written contract and to foreclose on liens against the property. Cruz counterclaimed against Andrews for deceptive-trade practices and for rescission of any contract with Protech. Chubb Lloyds counterclaimed for common-law fraud and insurance fraud. In summary-judgment proceedings the court determined Protech violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act by omitting contract language as to Cruz and could not collect from Chubb Lloyds on an implied contract for what Protech spent to stop the spreading mold or for alleged fraud. A jury then found that Cruz was not damaged by the omitted contract language that violated the DTPA and decided the insurer breached an oral agreement with Protech to stem the mold growth. It awarded Protech the amount of its unpaid bills, just over $705,000. The court of appeals reversed the award against Chubb Lloyds, holding that the insurer’s promise, if any, to pay for the mold remediation was not supported by consideration that would have satisfied the main-purpose exception to the statute of frauds’ requirement that a contract to pay debts owed by another must be in writing. The appeals court also rejected Cruz’s argument that he should have been awarded the more than $1 million he spent for Protech’s work on his contention that would "restore" him under the deceptive-trade practices statute. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 45:00 The Supreme Court of Texas Erwin, Cruz, Andrews, Restoration, Rudy, Martinez no no <b>Case No.10-0683</b> <br /> AHF-Arbors at Huntsville I LLC, et al. v. Walker County Appraisal District <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31807" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 37143705-56CD-47CA-85AC-2C37CC4E5FF5 Wed, 7 Dec 2011 14:10:40 -0600 10-0683 AHF-Arbors at Huntsville I LLC, et al. v. Walker County Appraisal District from Walker County and the 10th District Court of Appeals, Waco consolidated for argument with 10-0714, AHF-Arbors v. Walker County Appraisal District For petitioners: Connor G. Sheehan, Dallas For respondent: James R. Evans Jr., Austin The issues are whether (1) a parent company’s compliance with tax-code provisions establishing a certified-charitable housing organization sufficiently provides tax exemption for limited-liability companies wholly owned by the parent and (2) whether Arbors, the wholly owned subsidiaries, sufficiently complied with the tax-code provisions on their own. Arbors sued the appraisal district after the district denied its application for tax-exempt status for low- to moderate-income apartment complexes it owns in Huntsville. Arbors argues that "owns" as used in the tax code includes equitable title held by its parent. The trial court granted summary judgment to the district, determining that Arbors did not satisfy the tax-code requirement to show its entitlement to exemption from property taxes. The appeals court affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:55 The Supreme Court of Texas AHF-Arbors, Huntsville, Walker, County, Appraisal, District no no <b>Case No.10-0316</b> <br /> City of Austin v. Harry M. Whittington, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31443" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 25E44AC7-52C0-4DA0-8A24-B1E785E5EF76 Wed, 7 Dec 2011 14:08:03 -0600 10-0316 City of Austin v. Harry M. Whittington, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Renea Hicks, Austin For respondents: John J. McKetta III, Austin The issues are (1) whether condemnation can be invalidated by a city’s fraud, bad faith or arbitrary and capricious acts in taking land for an otherwise necessary public use and, if so, (2) whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that the city misrepresented its need for a water-chilling plant and for a parking garage on Whittington’s land because the city failed to force a contractor to comply with a contract to build such a garage in another place. In this case Whittington sued after the city condemned a downtown block he owned for a convention center-hotel parking garage and adjacent water-chilling plant. A jury found for Whittington on his claims that the city misrepresented the need for the garage and chilling plant on his land and acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in bad faith. The trial court found the city took the block for a public purpose, but held for Whittington, based on the jury’s findings that the city acted wrongfully. The court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 50:12 The Supreme Court of Texas City, Austin, Harry, Whittington no no <b>Case No.09-0905</b> <br /> Larry York v. State of Texas and Wise County <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=30949" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 12/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 73BBC627-41CB-4999-9BCB-C1E96F41939A Wed, 7 Dec 2011 14:03:27 -0600 09-0905 Larry York v. State of Texas and Wise County from Wise County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Samuel C. Bishop, Decatur For respondents: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin, and Thomas Michel, Fort Worth Two principal issues in this collateral attack on a justice-court judgment are (1) whether the collateral attack is proper on a judgment despite an automatic bankruptcy stay and (2) whether York’s takings claim may proceed from the JP court’s award to the state of property under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 47. In this case a highway patrol trooper seized a trailer from York because it did not have vehicle-identification markers. After a hearing, the justice court awarded the trailer to the county for its disposal as stolen property despite York’s evidence that the vehicle-identification numbers were removed when the trailer was painted and that he registered it and insured it. York did not appeal the chapter 47 judgment. After it became final, York sued the state and county, alleging the trailer was covered by a bankruptcy stay, and sought a declaration that the JP court’s judgment was void. He also claimed the state and county took his trailer without just compensation, arguing the only evidence that it was stolen was that it did not have vehicle-identification markers. The district court held it did not have jurisdiction because the JP judgment was final and also held the bankruptcy order was voidable, not void. The court of appeals held that the bankruptcy stay would make the justice-court judgment void, but York lost his right to attack it because he failed to apprise the justice court of the bankruptcy. The appeals court held that York could press his takings claim. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 48:39 The Supreme Court of Texas Larry, York, Texas, Wise, County no no <b>Case No.10-0970</b> <br /> Nicholas Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32087" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/10/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 28D0C864-7521-4B8E-B0CD-D87B7E18CD21 Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:28:37 -0600 10-0970 Nicholas Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States Inc. from Orange County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Jane S. Leger, Beaumont For respondent: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio The issues in this case involving an electrocution are (1) whether “transmission line” defined by the Texas Utility Code (and requiring a certain height above a roadway) applies to the power line above the road in this case and (2) whether a utility has a duty to agree on safety precautions for lines across a roadway. In this case Traxler sued Entergy, a power-distribution company, for negligence and negligence per se after a distribution line strung across a roadway burned him. Traxler, an employee of a house-moving company, was riding atop a house to assure obstacles were cleared as the house proceeded along a road. He alleges the power line he contacted was two feet lower than the Utility Code requires for a transmission line. He also contends Entergy failed to agree with the moving company about safety procedures as he argues the state Health and Safety Code requires. A jury awarded Traxler more than $1 million. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the power line that burned Traxler was not a transmission line covered by the Utility Code’s height requirement. The appeals court also held that state law did not impose a duty on Entergy to assure safety procedures. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 41:34 The Supreme Court of Texas Nicholas, Traxler, Entergy, Gulf, States no no <b>Case No.10-0960</b> <br /> In re XL Specialty Insurance Co. and Cambridge Integrated Services Group Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32077" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/10/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp FD1D741D-1377-4219-9244-6F22A23E4AB4 Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:26:07 -0600 10-0960 In re XL Specialty Insurance Co. and Cambridge Integrated Services Group Inc. from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For relators: David Brenner, Austin For real party in interest: Alan B. Daughtry, Houston The principal issue in this workers-compensation case is whether the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between an insured party, the employer, and the workers-comp insurer’s attorney. In this case XL’s argument centers on the common legal-interest doctrine, which the real party in interest disputes, arguing against the purported privilege because Texas workers-comp law bars an employer other than one insuring itself from making claims-handling or settlement decisions. Wagner, the employee, sued XL Specialty, his employer’s workers-comp insurer, for breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Raising privilege, XL refused the employee’s requested disclosure of communications between its attorney and the Wagner’s employer. The trial court granted Wagner’s motion to compel discovery and the appeals court denied XL’s petition for mandamus relief. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 40:40 The Supreme Court of Texas XL, Specialty, Insurance, Cambridge, Integrated, Services, Group no no <b>Case No.09-0079</b> <br /> Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D., and North Texas Cardiology Center v. Margaret Young <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=30130" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/10/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 2631EF31-5D5E-4977-AA46-4DF697D53DEF Thu, 10 Nov 2011 14:23:48 -0600 09-0079 Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D., and North Texas Cardiology Center v. Margaret Young from Wichita County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioners: Diana L. Faust, Dallas For respondents: J. Mark Perrin, Dallas In this medical-malpractice action, a principal issue is whether the trial court erred by submitting a contributory-negligence charge – that a patient’s delay in getting treatment for internal bleeding caused his harm – instead of a damages-mitigation charge. Other issues raise questions about the trial court’s submission of a new-and-independent-cause instruction and on unavoidable accident. Mrs. Young alleges Dr. Thota, who inserted a cardiac catheter in her late husband, negligently punctured the wrong artery. Thota argued either that the internal bleeding was an unavoidable accident or that Mr. Young’s delay in seeking treatment for the post-surgical bleeding caused his injury. (Mr. Young later died of leukemia.) In a broad-form submission combining questions on Thota’s alleged negligence, Young’s alleged contribution and the unavoidable accident and new-and-independent cause theories, the jury assessed all liability to Mr. Young. The court of appeals reversed, holding the trial court’s contributory-negligence instruction was wrong because Mr. Young’s delay in treatment went to mitigating his damages, not negligence. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 42:06 The Supreme Court of Texas Venkateswarlu, Thota, North, Texas, Cardiology, Margaret, Young no no <b>Case No.10-0776</b> <br /> Jack Edward Milner v. Vicki Ann Milner <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31899" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/09/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp FDD03441-776D-444B-80C4-3B84545EA2FC Wed, 9 Nov 2011 11:51:16 -0600 10-0776 Jack Edward Milner v. Vicki Ann Milner from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Jeff Kobs, Fort Worth For respondent: Rebecca Tillery, Dallas In this appeal from a contest over property division, the principal issues are (1) whether a mediated settlement conveyed the husband’s partnership in companies or just assigned rights to his interests; (2) whether contract law requirements - particularly a meeting of the minds - applies to enforcing a mediated settlement agreement; and (3) whether the divorce decree altered the settlement agreement by allegedly omitting substantive terms and conditions of the settlement. Upon divorce, Jack Milner agreed in a mediated settlement to convey to Vicki Milner his partnership interests in two limited partnerships. The settlement included consent signatures for Jack Milner’s other partners because the partnership agreements required all partners agree to take on a new partner. One partner refused. When Vicki Milner tried to withdraw her consent to the medicated settlement, Jack Milner moved for an agreed final divorce decree that did not reference the other partners’ necessary consent. After the trial court entered judgment on the mediated settlement and approved the final decree, Vicki Milner moved for a new trial, arguing that the final decree did not properly reflect the mediated settlement. The trial court denied the new-trial motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that mediated settlement satisfied statutory requirements but not the mutual-consent requirement of contract law. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 42:02 The Supreme Court of Texas Jack, Edward, Milner, Vicki, Ann no no <b>Case No.10-0687</b> <br /> In re Frank Kent Motor Co. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31811" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/09/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp DB9D02E9-AF5D-448F-B7AD-A547E0ABA88B Wed, 9 Nov 2011 11:49:05 -0600 10-0687 In re Frank Kent Motor Co. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For relator: Robert Ruotolo, Dallas For real party in interest: Timothy G. Chovanec, Fort Worth The issue is whether an employee may avoid a signed jury waiver in an employment handbook by claiming the waiver resulted from duress or coercion. Valdez, an ex-employee, sued Frank Kent for wrongful termination, claiming he was fired because of his age, and sought a jury trial. Frank Kent moved to strike the jury demand because Valdez had signed a jury waiver for any employment disputes a year before he was fired. Valdez countered the motion to strike with an affidavit attesting that his supervisor told him he would be fired if he did not sign the waiver. The trial court denied the company’s motion to strike. On the company’s mandamus petition, the appeals court denied relief. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 40:06 The Supreme Court of Texas Frank, Kent, Motor no no <b>Case No.10-0671</b> <br /> Kerry Heckman, et al. v. Williamson County, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31795" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/09/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 9460E5EA-07C3-4D02-AB97-D2B82CC52923 Wed, 9 Nov 2011 11:43:17 -0600 10-0671 Kerry Heckman, et al. v. Williamson County, et al. from Williamson County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Harry Williams IV, Seattle For respondents: Henry W. Prejean, Georgetown, and C. Robert Heath, Austin In this proposed class action brought under section 1983, misdemeanor defendants allege the county denied their constitutional rights to appointed counsel and to open-court hearings. The issues are (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek class certification even though named plaintiffs no longer suffer alleged injuries and (2) whether the claims should have been remanded to consider the county’s argument that policy changes made the claims moot. Four misdemeanor defendants and the mother of a juvenile facing a marijuana-possession complaint variously complain that they were systematically denied appointed counsel in their first appearances in court (all later were appointed counsel) and that their initial appearances, in a secure section of the county jail, were closed to the public, including defendants’ families. When the trial court denied the county’s jurisdictional plea, the county took an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed, holding that none of the plaintiffs had standing on all claims of the proposed class. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 49:18 The Supreme Court of Texas Kerry, Heckman, Williamson, County no no <b>Case No.10-0605</b> <br /> Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Frederick Williams <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31729" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/08/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp CDA54BA2-26EB-42CF-AF2E-F0707ADBB6FE Tue, 8 Nov 2011 11:23:42 -0600 10-0605 In re Commitment of Michael Bohannan from Montgomery County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Catherine Palmore, Huntsville For respondent: Kenneth Nash, Huntsville The issue in this sexual predator-commitment case is whether Bohannon’s expert, a therapist without forensic training, was properly disqualified from testifying whether he suffered a behavioral abnormality, a necessary factor to assessing a sexually violent predator. On the state’s challenge of the expert’s qualifications, the trial court after a Daubert hearing barred her testimony on whether Bohannon was likely to reoffend because the court determined she is not a psychiatrist or psychologist and lacks forensic training. The appeals court reversed, holding that the expert, experienced in treating sexual offenders, was qualified to assess his recidivism risk ad her testimony would assist the jury. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:49 The Supreme Court of Texas Commitment, Michael, Bohannan no no <b>Case No.10-0603</b> <br /> Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Frederick Williams <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31727" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 11/08/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp A8BA4686-C4DD-404B-81B3-19C7A02483A6 Tue, 8 Nov 2011 11:20:06 -0600 10-0603 Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Frederick Williams from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Ryan L. Clement, Houston For respondent: Charles M. Hessel, Houston The issue is whether a hospital employee’s negligence claim against his employer based on a fight with a paranoid-schizophrenic patient is a health care-liability claim and, if so, whether the employee is a "claimant" under the statute who must file an expert report. Williams, injured in the fight that resulted in the patient’s death, sued the hospital after the patient’s estate named him as well as the hospital in a health care-liability claim. In his cross claims, Williams alleged the hospital did not train him adequately to handle dangerous patients or adequately warn or supervise him with the patient. The hospital moved to dismiss Williams’ suit because he did not submit a health care-liability expert report. The trial court denied the dismissal motion and the court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 47:41 The Supreme Court of Texas Texas, West, Oaks, Hospital, Frederick, Williams no no <b>Case No.11-0589</b> <br /> Allcat Claims Service L.P. and John Weakly v. Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, and Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=32732" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/24/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 9EA66971-465D-4BE6-98B0-EBDD162221FB Fri, 4 Nov 2011 12:40:00 -0500 11-0589 Allcat Claims Service L.P. and John Weakly v. Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, and Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General Direct appeal to the Texas Supreme Court For plaintiffs: James F. Martens, Austin For defendants: Danica Milios, Austin For amicus curiae businesses: Christopher S. Johns, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the franchise tax on limited partnerships’ income is an unconstitutional personal-income tax; (2) if not, whether the state comptroller’s application of the tax violates the state constitution’s mandate that taxes be equal and uniform; and (3) whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide the equal-and-uniform constitutional challenge. In its challenge, original and exclusive in this Court by statute, Allcat seeks a judgment declaring the tax unconstitutional on its face or as it has been applied to the company and seeks attorneys fees. Legislators approved the franchise tax on limited partnerships in 2006 as it revised the state’s public-school financing law after the Court held the school-finance system unconstitutional the year before. Allcat argues that taxing limited-partnership income violates the constitutional prohibition on a personal-income tax without voters’ approval because such a tax actually is on income distributed to partners and not on an entity distinct from its partners. If the franchise tax on limited partnerships is not unconstitutional for that reason, Allcat contends, the comptroller has interpreted in a way that treats Allcat differently from other taxpayers in similar situations. This Court has original jurisdiction to decide the question of how the tax has been applied, Allcat argues, citing Texas Government Code section 22.002(c). The comptroller responds that Texas law recognizes limited partnerships as entities and that taxing the limited partnership’s margin - a calculation that is the lesser of 70 percent of total revenue or total revenue minus certain business costs - is a tax on the business entity, not the partners’ shares of its income. As to the challenge to the comptroller’s interpretation and how it applies to Allcat, the comptroller contends that goes beyond the Legislature’s decision to give the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the margin tax itself. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 1:07:47 The Supreme Court of Texas Allcat, Claims, Service, Weakly, Combs, Texas, Comptroller, Public, Abbott, Attorney no no <b>Case No.10-0548</b> <br /> Rusk State Hospital v. Dennis Black and Pam Black <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31672" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp A2DDFA94-58D7-4EF8-95C6-DA8241E282F5 Thu, 6 Oct 2011 15:11:24 -0500 10-0548 Rusk State Hospital v. Dennis Black and Pam Black from Cherokee County and the 12th District Court of Appeals, Tyler For petitioner: Michael Murphy, Austin For respondents: Dennis Black, Tyler A principal issue is whether sovereign immunity may be raised in an interlocutory appeal from a trial-court order that did not address subject-matter jurisdictional challenges that were not presented to the trial court. In this case the Blacks sued Rusk State Hospital over their son’s suicide and filed expert reports required to establish a health care-liability claim. The state appealed from the trial court’s order denying its challenge to the reports’ adequacy and added in that interlocutory appeal its initial argument that the suit should be dismissed on immunity grounds. The court of appeals addressed the state’s expert-reports challenge, but held that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8), permitting interlocutory appeal of certain trial decisions before judgment, does not authorize such appeals on claims that have not been considered by the trial court. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 37:01 The Supreme Court of Texas Rusk, State, Hospital, Black no no <b>Case No.10-0526</b> <br /> In re United Scaffolding Inc. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31650" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 33A0EE9E-F353-430E-9D40-48DA7971B82A Thu, 6 Oct 2011 15:08:07 -0500 10-0526 In re United Scaffolding Inc. from Jefferson County and Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For relator: Kathleen M. Kennedy, Beaumont For real party in interest: Chris M. Portner, Beaumont The issue is whether, after remand to specify reasons for a new trial ordered "in the interest of justice and fairness," the trial court’s reconstituted new-trial order abused its discretion for failing again to specify reasons. After a hearing on remand, the trial court issued another new-trial order, concluding without more on three points that the jury verdict was "against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence" and - in addition to those reasons or in the alternative - was in "the interest of justice and fairness." In a split decision the court of appeals denied United Scaffolding’s second mandamus petition challenging the new order. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 50:07 The Supreme Court of Texas United, Scaffolding no no <b>Case No.10-0523</b> <br /> Port Elevator-Brownsville LLC v. Rogelio Casados and Rafaela Casados <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31647" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/06/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 2167AD49-61D8-4750-87C8-2863D0ED0101 Thu, 6 Oct 2011 15:05:28 -0500 10-0523 Port Elevator-Brownsville LLC v. Rogelio Casados and Rafaela Casados from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Mary A. Keeney, Austin For respondents: David Keltner, Fort Worth The issue is whether a temporary employee provided by a staffing company is limited to a workers-compensation recovery against the client company when its policy has classifications not explicitly including the temporary employee and the client employer does not pay premiums specifically for temporary employees. In this case Casados’ parents sued Port Elevator after his work-site death. Casados was an employee of a temporary-staffing company that provided workers for Port Elevator. Port Elevator’s workers-comp insurer initially refused coverage. The trial court denied the elevator company’s summary-judgment motion, based on the "comp bar" provision limiting an injured worker’s remedies to workers-comp insurance. A jury found Port Elevator negligent in Casados’ death. On review, the appeals court held Casados was not covered under Port Elevator’s workers-comp policy and affirmed the trial-court judgment. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:07 The Supreme Court of Texas Port, Elevator-Brownsville, Rogelio, Casados, Rafaela, Casados no no <b>Case No.10-0513</b> <br /> Matthew W. Wasserman, M.D. v. Christina Bergeron Gugel <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31637" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/05/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp FAC56A7B-F04C-4F62-BCC9-5A8F371162BD Wed, 5 Oct 2011 16:40:38 -0500 10-0513 Matthew W. Wasserman, M.D. v. Christina Bergeron Gugel from Harris County and the 14th District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Holly H. Williamson, Houston For respondent: Reginald E. McKamie, Houston The issue is a whether a sexual assault alleged during a medical examination constitutes a health-care liability claim that would require an expert report. Gugel sued Wasserman for inappropriately touching her genitalia during an examination to determine the cause of pain and numbness in her lower back and legs. Gugel also claimed he sexually harassed her in later calls. Wasserman moved to dismiss Gugel’s complaint because she did not file a health-care expert report. The trial court denied the doctor’s motion and the court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 49:22 The Supreme Court of Texas Matthew, Wasserman, Christina, Bergeron, Gugel no no <b>Case No.10-0491</b> <br /> Hearts Bluff Game Ranch Inc. v. State of Texas and Texas Water Development Board <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31615" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/05/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp B5DD5B76-40E3-45A6-9616-AC7A70376D7A Wed, 5 Oct 2011 16:37:40 -0500 10-0491 Hearts Bluff Game Ranch Inc. v. State of Texas and Texas Water Development Board from Travis County and Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Terry Jacobson, Corsicana For respondents: Arthur C. D’Andrea, Austin The issue is whether an inverse-condemnation claim is proper against the state based on allegations the state acted to cause a federal agency to deny a wetlands-preservation permit in a area the state designated for a northeast Texas reservoir. In Hearts Bluff’s lawsuit against the Texas Water Development Board, the company claimed the state lobbied the federal Army Corps of Engineers to deny Hearts Bluff Game Ranch a wetlands mitigation bank for property the company bought with assurance that the mitigation bank would be approved. The proposed mitigation area lay in an area proposed for a reservoir the state Legislature eventually approved. The state pleaded that the court did not have jurisdiction, based on sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the state’s jurisdictional plea, but the appeals court reversed. In addition to the elements for an inverse-condemnation claim, the court held, Hearts Bluff must have established - and did not - that the water development agency effected the taking by a direct restriction resulting from its own regulatory power. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 38:53 The Supreme Court of Texas Hearts, Bluff, Game, Ranch, Texas, Water, Development no no <b>Case No.10-0451</b> <br /> Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America v. William Justiss, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31575" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/05/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp EF950EC4-75B7-4B1B-9509-E793F4049881 Wed, 5 Oct 2011 16:34:40 -0500 10-0451 Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America v. William Justiss, et al. from Lamar County and the Sixth District Court of Appeals, Texarkana For petitioner: Brett Busby, Houston For respondents: James R. Rodgers, Paris The issues are (1) whether sufficient evidence supported permanent-nuisance claims accruing within the two-year statutory limitations; (2) whether property owners’ testimony was sufficient to support diminution-in-value damage to their property; and (3) whether prejudgment interest was proper if plaintiffs did not segregate past and future damages. In this case Justiss and other property owners sued over claims of "unbearable" noise and odor from a natural gas-compressor station built in 1992. Noise and odor complaints began shortly after the station began operating. Justiss filed suit two months after the state cited the compressor station in 1998 for exceeding permitted emissions levels. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded more than $2.2 million for declining property values and almost $650,000 in interest. The court of appeals affirmed, holding sufficient evidence supported 1998 as the date the cause of action accrued. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:02 The Supreme Court of Texas Natural, Gas, Pipeline, William, Justiss no no <b>Case No.10-0435</b> <br /> Weeks Marine Inc. v. Maximino Garza <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31558" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/04/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp B3DE723C-8649-4259-B271-48F2D46E8FF7 Tue, 4 Oct 2011 16:00:28 -0500 10-0435 Weeks Marine Inc. v. Maximino Garza from Starr County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioner: Frank E. Pérez, Brownsville For respondent: Edward John "Jack" O’Neill Jr., Houston For amicus King Fisher Marine Services: Steven J. Knight, Houston Principal issues in this Jones Act action are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Weeks’ failure to provide "maintenance and cure" aggravated Garza’s original injury and (2) whether damages for negligence and for failure to provide maintenance and cure were duplicative. Garza filed suit after he was hit in the head by a swinging bar aboard a barge, claiming negligence under the federal Jones Act and aggravation of that injury by Weeks’ failure to get adequate treatment for the injury. Weeks’ preferred physician cleared Garza to return to work. but after Garza continued to complain of symptoms, his own doctor referred him for surgery. The trial court awarded damages for the injury and pain and suffering because of the failure to provide maintenance and cure. On review, the court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that damages did not amount to a double recovery. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:47 The Supreme Court of Texas Weeks, Marine, Maximino, Garza no no <b>Case No.10-0429</b> <br /> Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Ralph Ross <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31553" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/04/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp A7A70F67-CC31-4F16-8652-E6157A12BDFE Tue, 4 Oct 2011 15:58:08 -0500 10-0429 Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Ralph Ross from Harris County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioners: Marie R. Yeates, Houston For respondent: Mark L. Perlmutter, Austin Among principal issues in this royalty dispute are (1) whether Shell’s alleged fraudulent concealment bars limitations on the suit to recover underpaid royalties; (2) whether the lessee had a due-diligence duty to inquire about the payments based on statements and other public information; and (3) whether Shell’s weighted-average calculation for royalties complied with the lease. In this case the appeals court affirmed the jury’s verdict that Shell and related entities fraudulently concealed the basis for its royalty calculations on leased wells and those in pooled units and that the calculations breached Ross’s lease. Ross sued after the four-year limitations period had ended, but contends limitations are tolled if Shell fraudulently concealed the price structure for paying royalties on gas from the wells. Shell argues that Ross could have discovered the pricing discrepancies from publicly available information and, as with the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment should not allow Ross to avoid limitations. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 41:53 The Supreme Court of Texas Shell, Oil, Ralph, Ross no no <b>Case No.10-0426</b> <br /> Safeshred Inc. v. Louis Martinez III <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31550" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 10/04/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 383D93F4-77C8-4D94-99D1-EB2459C0EAD1 Tue, 4 Oct 2011 15:54:24 -0500 10-0426 Safeshred Inc. v. Louis Martinez III from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Craig A. Morgan, Austin For respondent: Gregory D. Jordan, Austin Principal issues are (1) whether a Sabine Pilot wrongful-discharge claim can support a punitive-damages award, (2) whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s malice finding and, if so, (3) whether the punitive damages were constitutionally excessive. Martinez sued after Safeshred allegedly fired him for refusing to drive what he considered to be an unsafe truckload of steel shelving. His refusal followed previous occasions that he complained about load-safety issues and other regulatory-compliance matters with Safeshred trucks. A jury found his firing was retaliatory and awarded $250,000 in exemplary damages, along with lost wages and mental-anguish damages. The trial court applied the statutory exemplary-damages cap to reduce the award to $200,000. The court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 48:07 The Supreme Court of Texas Safeshred, Martinez no no <b>Case No.10-0490</b> <br /> El Apple I, Ltd. v. Myriam Olivas <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31614" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/15/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 3571F566-06A8-4142-B4DD-69656638AFA8 Thu, 15 Sep 2011 15:34:56 -0500 10-0490 El Apple I, Ltd. v. Myriam Olivas from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Joseph L. Hood Jr., El Paso For respondent: John P. Mobbs, El Paso A principal issue in this discrimination and retaliation suit is whether state or federal law governs attorneys-fees calculations under a state act enacted to effect a federal discrimination statute. Other issues challenge differing features of applying lodestar methods for calculating fees. In this case Olivas sued for sex discrimination and retaliation. A jury found her employer did not discriminate against her based on her gender, but that her discrimination complaint was a motivating factor in its creating a hostile-work environment. The trial court awarded attorneys fees supported by her lawyers’ affidavits and not billing records, as federal law requires, and did not require the fees to break down how much time was spent separately on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the affidavits were legally sufficient to support the trial court’s fees award and that work on the claims was too intertwined to separate time spent on one versus time spent on the other. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:52 The Supreme Court of Texas El, Apple, Myriam, Olivas no no <b>Case No.10-0375</b> <br /> Atmos Energy Corp., et al. v. Cities of Allen, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31501" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/15/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 716E2011-B0A0-49A2-A470-957362FF6393 Thu, 15 Sep 2011 15:27:44 -0500 10-0375 Atmos Energy Corp., et al. v. Cities of Allen, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents Atmos, et al.: Ann M. Coffin and David Duggins, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents cities: Jose E. de la Fuente, Austin For respondent Railroad Commission: Priscilla Hubenak, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the Texas Railroad Commission has appellate jurisdiction over the cities’ denials of a utility’s interim rate-increase filing and, if so, (2) whether the cities get a contested hearing for an interim-rate adjustment. In this case Allen and other cities sued for a declaratory judgment to void an administrative rule permitting interim rates for gas utilities’ infrastructure improvements because the rule did not provide for a contested hearing. Allen and the other cities rejected the rate adjustments, but the Railroad Commission granted them without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied the cities’ request that it declare the rule void, finding the cities could conduct a ministerial review of an interim rate increase but not otherwise deny it. The court of appeals affirmed that cities were not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on an interim rate adjustment and held the Railroad Commission did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the cities’ denial. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:47 The Supreme Court of Texas Atmos, Energy, Corp, Cities, Allen no no <b>Case No.10-0353</b> <br /> Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31479" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/15/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 61171633-0546-47AE-A6AD-2C59070C1C34 Thu, 15 Sep 2011 15:26:52 -0500 10-0353 Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chatha from Waller County and the First District Court of Appeals, Houston For petitioner: Beth Klusmann, Austin For respondent: Ellen Sprovach, Houston The issue is whether the 180-day limitations on an employment-discrimination suit under the Texas Commission in Human Rights Act runs from the alleged discriminatory act or the last paycheck resulting from that act. In this case Chatha sued, alleging pay discrimination for her position as a full professor. She initially was denied the promotion, but promoted after she complained and applied again. But she alleged her pay was not appropriate for the promotion. Prairie View moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea because Chatha’s discrimination complaint to administrative agencies was beyond the 180-day statutory window for when the discriminatory practice - her promotion with alleged inadequate pay - "occurred." Under a federal amendment to the federal statute that the state Human Rights Act follows in substance, occurred is defined as including the discriminatory effects of an employer’s decision. That leaves a question whether the Texas statute of limitation must follow the federal amendment. The trial court denied the university’s plea and the appeals court affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:17 The Supreme Court of Texas Prairie, View, A&M, University, Diljit, Chatha no no <b>Case No.10-0374</b> <br /> Texas Department of Insurance v. American National Insurance Co. and American Life Insurance Co. of Texas <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31500" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/14/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp F65F7532-D660-4224-901F-9E884AED68EE Wed, 14 Sep 2011 11:16:30 -0500 10-0374 Texas Department of Insurance v. American National Insurance Co. and American Life Insurance Co. of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals. Austin For petitioner: Arthur C. D'Andrea, Austin For respondent: Susan G. Conway, Austin The issue in this appeal from a declaratory judgment is whether stop-loss agreements involving self-funded insurance plans are direct insurance, subject to state regulation and certain fees, or reinsurance outside the state’s regulation. Stop-loss policies are sold to cover self-funded plans for those occasions when the self-funded plan must pay a loss that exceeds an agreed-upon amount, called an "attachment point." The insurance department contends the companies issuing stop-loss policies sell direct insurance, subject to state regulation and to fees to the Texas Health Insurance Risk Pool. The trial court found for the department, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that stop-loss agreements constitute reinsurance outside the state insurance department’s regulation. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 44:36 The Supreme Court of Texas Department, Insurance, American, National, Life no no <b>Case No.10-0321</b> <br /> Texas Department of Public Safety v. Stephen Joseph Caruana <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31448" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/14/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 5285EA0C-E2A0-4371-A161-D091E688A04D Wed, 14 Sep 2011 11:13:26 -0500 10-0321 Texas Department of Public Safety v. Stephen Joseph Caruana from Hays County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Kevin M. Givens, Austin For respondent: Brian L. Baker, San Marcos The issue in this license-revocation appeal is whether an alcohol-breath test officer’s notarized statement about breath test’s result was admissible in the revocation hearing even though the analyst did not swear to it. Caruana challenged an administrative-law judge’s finding that the department proved his intoxication while driving by admission of the breath-test analyst’s unsworn statement. Under the relevant Texas Transportation Code provision (section 524.011(b)(4)(D)) a sworn report relevant to a drunk-driving arrest shall be sent to the department within five business days. The pertinent administrative regulation allows a sworn report to be admissible as a public record. The trial court reversed the administrative-law judge and the appeals court affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 45:50 The Supreme Court of Texas Texas, Department, Public, Safety, DPS, Caruana no no <b>Case No.10-0121</b> <br /> Finance Commission of Texas, et al. v. Valerie Norwood, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31253" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 09/13/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 9820941F-1B9E-4776-96E9-7C947E3B56FD Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:39:38 -0500 10-0121 Finance Commission of Texas, et al. v. Valerie Norwood, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Evan S. Green and Craig Enoch, Austin For respondents: Robert Doggett and Nelson Mock, Austin Among principal issues in this challenge to regulations promulgated for home-equity lending in Texas are (1) whether deference should be the review standard for agency interpretations when the agencies - the Finance Commission and Credit Union Commission - were given power to interpret the constitutional home-equity provisions; (2) whether the two commissions erred by adopting the Finance Code’s definition of "interest" for interpreting the constitutional provisions; and (3) whether the appeals court erred when it upheld agency rules that allow signing a home-equity loan by power of attorney instead of in specific locations set by the home-equity amendment. The trial court invalidated seven of nine challenged regulations. On review, the court of appeals held the standard of review should be the deference given to state-agency statutory interpretations. The appeals court affirmed the trial court in part and reversed and rendered judgment in part, holding the commissions’ rules defining interest were contrary to the intent and plain meaning of the constitutional home-equity lending provision. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 47:19 The Supreme Court of Texas Finance, Commission, Norwood no no <b>Case No.09-0901</b> <br /> Texas Rice Land Partners Ltd. and Mike Latta v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=30945" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 04/19/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 1F370562-425E-434D-956B-422BD021B632 Wed, 25 May 2011 08:34:59 -0500 09-0901 Texas Rice Land Partners Ltd. and Mike Latta v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC from Jefferson County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Amy Warr, Austin For respondent: Lynne Liberato, Houston The principal issue is whether a pipeline qualifies as a with because its owner assured the Texas Railroad Commission the pipeline would be available to ship carbon dioxide for other than Denbury affiliates. Denbury initiated this suit after Texas Rice, which leases farmland to Latta, refused to let Denbury’s surveyors onto its property for a pipeline survey. Before the suit, Denbury and Texas Rice had negotiated the survey details but without agreement. Denbury then applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for a common-carrier permit that would allow it to condemn a pipeline easement. The commission approved the common-carrier status and the trial court granted Denbury summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction to bar interference with the survey. Texas Rice argues, as it did to the court of appeals, that a factual dispute exists whether he pipeline will be only for private use. The appeals court affirmed the summary judgment and injunction. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 48:28 The Supreme Court of Texas Texas, Rice, Land, Partners, Mike, Latta, Denbury, Green, Pipeline-Texas no no <b>Case No.09-0387</b> <br /> Carol Severance v. Jerry Patterson, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=30434" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 04/19/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp D68CCC95-B60A-4241-90CC-30B79C4AECC8 Wed, 25 May 2011 08:29:21 -0500 09-0387 Carol Severance v. Jerry Patterson, et al. certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit For appellant: J. David Breemer, Sacramento, Calif. For appellees: Daniel L. Geyser, Austin In this rehearing involving Hurricane Rita’s beach destruction in Galveston, and consequent change in public access under the Texas Open Beaches Act, the federal circuit court asks: (1) whether Texas recognizes a "rolling" public beachfront-access easement; if so, (2) whether the rolling easement derives from common law or the Open Beaches Act; and (3) what extent the landowner would be entitled to compensation for loss of property use apart from the state’s offer to remove houses on the easement. In a 6-2 opinion by Justice Wainwright issued November 5, the Court held that public easements do not "roll" onto previously unencumbered private beachfront property when avulsive events cause dramatic coastline changes. The Court reasoned that the Open Beaches Act, enacted in 1959, did not purport to create new substantive rights for public easements along Texas’ ocean beaches and recognized that mere pronouncements of encumbrances on private property rights are improper. Because no public-use right exists in historic grants to private owners on West Beach exists, the Court said, the state must comply with legal principles to encumber privately owned realty along Galveston Island’s West Beach. Land patents from the Texas Republic in 1840, affirmed by legislation after statehood, conveyed the state’s title in West Galveston Island to private parties and reserved no ownership interests or public-use rights in Galveston’s West Beach. In a dissent Justice Medina, joined by Justice Lehrmann, concluded the Open Beaches Act enforces a reasoned balance between private property rights and the public’s right to free and unrestricted use of the beach. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 54:46 The Supreme Court of Texas Carol, Severance, Jerry, Patterson no no <b>Case No.10-0235</b> <br /> In re State of Texas <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31364" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 03/03/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 06755585-9E46-4D73-A289-1DC506447458 Mon, 18 Apr 2011 14:03:39 -0500 10-0235 In re State of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For relator State of Texas: Susan Desmarais Bonnen, Austin For real parties in interest: Stephen I. Adler, Austin The issue is whether the trial court acted within its discretion by splitting a condemnation action into separate actions when the property owners subdivided the original tract after the original condemnation was filed. In this case the state challenged the trial court’s decision to divide compensation claims into eight separate suits. The property owners who held the original parcel subdivided it in part, they claimed, to demonstrate its higher value. Special commissioners assigned to sort from competing valuations split the difference in appraised values, the new owners moved to split the claims from the commissioners’ award, arguing that none was commonly owned and none of the eight tracts bordered another. The trial court granted the motions. The appeals court denied the state’s petition to prevent the split claims. The state contends in part that dividing the claims was improper because subdivision occurred after the condemnation notice involving one tract and one set of owners. But the owners argue that the subdivision occurred before the state actually took the land - the date the state pays for the land - so assessing the value of eight tracts was proper. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:30 The Supreme Court of Texas Texas no no <b>Case No.09-0340</b> <br /> Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Carmen Muro <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=30388" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 03/03/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 64D6A1EA-6C1C-4BDD-ABC4-753B53381086 Mon, 18 Apr 2011 14:00:59 -0500 09-0340 Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Carmen Muro from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Robert D. Stokes, Austin For respondent: Chad Ruback, Dallas The issues in this workers compensation case are (1) whether Texas law requires a direct injury to feet and hands in order to support benefits for permanent loss of feet and hands alleged as a result of a back, neck, shoulder and hip injury and (2) whether the trial court should have had the jury decide whether the injuries Muro suffered produced the lost use of her feet and hand. In this case the insurance carrier challenged a hearing officer’s determination granting Muro lifetime disability income for on-the-job injuries that she claimed resulted in permanent loss of a hand and her feet. A jury found Muro had permanent loss of her feet and the hand, awarded her lifetime benefits and attorneys fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a direct injury is unnecessary to support the award and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to submit a producing-cause jury question. The insurance company argues that the jury should have considered the producing-cause factor because evidence indicated Muro had normal feelings in her feet and hand and use of them after the accident. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 46:15 The Supreme Court of Texas Insurance, Pennsylvania, Carmen, Muro no no <b>Case No.10-0141</b> <br /> Vernon F. Minton v. Jerry W. Gunn, et al. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31273" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 03/01/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 9A57FFAD-28A3-4C84-8771-DB0D3F03A679 Mon, 18 Apr 2011 13:55:06 -0500 10-0141 Vernon F. Minton v. Jerry W. Gunn, et al. from Tarrant County and the Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth For petitioner: Thomas M. Michel, Fort Worth For respondents: David Keltner, Fort Worth A principal issue is whether the controlling question in this legal-malpractice suit arising from a patent-enforcement case is a substantial patent issue that must be answered exclusively by a federal court, that is, whether an exception (experimental-use doctrine) to a defense ("on sale" bar rule) could apply in the underlying patent litigation. Minton sued his attorneys for alleged malpractice, claiming he lost $100 million as a result of their failure to plead an exception to a defense. In the first suit, Minton sued to enforce a patent for an online stock-trading program. The trial court in that litigation granted summary judgment for the defendants because Minton supposedly offered his program for sale more than a year before applying for a patent. By itself, that would trigger the on-sale bar rule, which invalidates a patent if the product is offered for sale for commercial use more than a year before the patent application. The question in this case is whether Minton’s attorneys failed to plead the exception to that rule, the experimental-use doctrine. Under the exception, a product offered for test or experiment more than a year before a patent application can negate the on-sale bar rule. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the case presented factual questions, not issues requiring federal court interpretation that would control the state malpractice suit. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 42:16 The Supreme Court of Texas Vernon, Minton, Jerry, Gunn no no <b>Case No.09-1010</b> <br /> FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems L.C. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31054" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 03/01/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 58A089E6-87E5-4915-996F-AE9E4ACBA5AF Mon, 18 Apr 2011 13:51:06 -0500 09-1010 FPL Farming Ltd. v. Environmental Processing Systems L.C. from Liberty County and the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Beaumont For petitioner: Claudia Wilson Frost, Houston For respondents: Richard G. Baker, Liberty In this subsurface-trespass case, the principal issues are (1) whether a permit-holder with authority to inject wastewater underground can be immune because of the state-issued permit from liability when the wastewater intrudes beneath neighboring property and, if so, (2) whether that constitutes an unconstitutional taking. A turning-point issue is whether subsurface water migration can be actionable as a trespass. FPL Farming, owner of two tracts in Liberty County, initially opposed the state’s 1996 wastewater-injection permits to Environmental Processing Systems on land near FPL’s. FPL Farming settled with Environmental Processing, but sued when the state (then the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) granted an amendment in 1999 to increase the allowed injection rate. FPL Farming alleged the wastewater migrated under its land. A jury rejected FPL’s claims and the court of appeals affirmed. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 49:27 The Supreme Court of Texas FPL, Farming, Environmental, Processing no no <b>Case No.10-0688</b> <br /> CMH Homes Inc., et al. v. Adam Perez <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31812" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/03/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp A7D47527-1D99-496F-B357-002A4601637A Wed, 16 Feb 2011 14:19:27 -0600 10-0688 CMH Homes Inc., et al. v. Adam Perez from Duval County and the Fourth District Court of Appeals, San Antonio For petitioners: Scott A. Brister, Austin For respondent: Brendan McBride, San Antonio The principal issue is whether a trial court order appointing an arbitrator in lieu of the parties’ impasse is subject to interlocutory review under Civil Practices and Remedies Code . If not, counsel for CMH Homes argues that the interlocutory appeal should be considered a mandamus petition, inviting the Court to adopt the concurrence in In re D. Wilson Construction Co. (at 784, suggesting an improper appeal should be treated as a mandamus petition). ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:11 The Supreme Court of Texas CMH, Homes, Perez no no <b>Case No.10-0434</b> <br /> ½ Price Checks Cashed v. United Automobile Insurance Co. <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31559" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/03/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 525A6F82-DB2B-4FED-A643-08ABD37CD39B Wed, 16 Feb 2011 14:16:30 -0600 10-0434 ½ Price Checks Cashed v. United Automobile Insurance Co. from Dallas County and the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Dallas For petitioner: Gavin N. Lewis, Aledo For respondent: Douglas W. Alexander, Austin The issue is whether an action to recover on a dishonored check should be considered essentially a contract suit that allows awarding . In this case ½ Price Checks Cashed sued after United refused to pay on a check its bank would not honor. The trial court awarded attorneys fees, but the court of appeals reversed, citing its decision in Time Out Grocery v. The Vanguard Group. United argues that a contract, for attorneys fees recoverable by statute, must be a bilateral agreement. Half-Price contends Civil Practices and Remedies Code 38.001 extends to statutory obligations, citing Medical City Dallas v. Carlisle Corp. (allowing attorneys fees for warranty-breach action). ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 40:43 The Supreme Court of Texas ½, Price, Checks, Cashed, United, Automobile, Insurance no no <b>Case No.10-0283</b> <br /> Christopher N. Epps and Laura L. Epps v. Bruce Fowler Jr. and Stephanie L. Fowler <br /> <a href="http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/Case.asp?FilingID=31410" target="_blank" >View Case Information</a> <br /><br /> Argued 02/03/2011 http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2011oa.asp 89584CBF-9603-4FC5-8878-751CD6CCC830 Wed, 16 Feb 2011 14:13:03 -0600 10-0283 Christopher N. Epps and Laura L. Epps v. Bruce Fowler Jr. and Stephanie L. Fowler from Williamson County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: N. West Short, Georgetown For respondents: Frank B. Lyon, Austin In this case involving the plaintiffs’ dismissal of deceptive trade-practices claims by non-suiting them, the issues are (1) whether the defendant is entitled to contractual attorneys fees as the prevailing party and (2) whether the appeals court should have remanded instead of rendering judgment to allow the defendants to press a reserved sanctions motion. When the Fowlers sued over an alleged foundation defect in the house the Eppses sold them, the Eppses denied the allegations and claimed their attorneys fees, based on the home-sale contract. The Fowlers non-suited their claims, but the Eppses proceeded to trial on the fees issue and won almost $23,000. The court of appeals rendered judgment that the Eppses take nothing. ************************** Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. 43:11 The Supreme Court of Texas Epps, Fowler no no