IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
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No. 05-0236
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The State of
v.
J. Grady Brown, Jr., Respondent
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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of
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Justice O’Neill, concurring and dissenting.
I agree fully with the Court’s conclusion that Property Code sections 21.019 and 21.0195 do not authorize the award of all fees and expenses under these circumstances. I dissent only because I would remand the case, rather than render judgment, so that the trial court may consider imposing any sanctions available under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 (authorizing sanctions when a pleading is groundless or not brought in good faith); Tex. R. Civ. P. 70 (permitting a trial court to require a party whose amended or supplemental pleading surprises and prejudices another party to pay the additional costs and expenses incurred by the surprised party as a result of the surprise); Tex. R. Civ. P. 215 (providing for sanctions when a party abuses or fails to comply with discovery proceedings and requests).
As the Court notes, we recently held
that such sanctions against a condemning authority are available because
Property Code section 21.018(b) stipulates that condemnation trials are to be
conducted in the same manner as any other civil trial. PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v.
___________________________________
Harriet O’Neill
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: August 29, 2008